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ABSTRACT
The research area of this thesis is an operational issue of the Venezuelan Navy.
The specific area of research is the development of a Maritime Traffic Control Model that
guarantees the efficient accomplishment of surveillance and protection of the territorial
sea. The principal task is reducing the number of potential illegal shipments, for example
drugs, toxic waste, or other outlaw activities in the Venezuelan sea.
Currently, several operational activities are executed as a response against illegal
shipments. However, these operational activities require many resources and a
considerable amount of time. These operational tasks depend primarily on intelligence
efforts that represent a high financial cost and additional risky actions. For these reasons,
the successful execution of the maritime control mission requires more dynamic and
efficient approaches to maximize operational benefits.
One solution for this problem is the development of a stochastic decision making
model, to analyze and set up inspection or interdiction operations in those areas whose
geographic features represent closed transit areas for navigation. This decision model
should be an important aid for the execution of maritime traffic control operations in
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t period of time unit (week, month, etc.).
/ period length (hours).
I time to inspect a ship. (hours).
m number of areas to be patrolled, indexed j = l,2,3....m.
X j average number of outside ships coming to harbor through area j during a time
period of length/
kj(t) number of "bad" ships found in area j in a period t
Rj updated estimate of the fraction of illegal ships in area j after an inspection is
carried out.
Xj(t) fraction of ships entering area j that are "bad" (have an illegal shipment on board)
during time period t.
A, (t) number of assets assigned to area j in period t. An asset consists of a pair of ships,
n total number of assets that are available for assignment.
Capj number of ships that an asset can inspected per period of time in areaj.
dj(t) number of ships inspected in areaj in period t.
e odds ratio confidence level
^j(t) updated mean of the proportion of ships carrying illegal cargo in area j after all
inspections are carried out in period t.
o]
:
(t) updated variance of the proportion of ships carrying illegal cargo in areaj after all
inspections are carried out in period t.
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The research area of this thesis is an operational issue of the Venezuelan Navy.
The specific area of research is to develop a Maritime Traffic Control Model that
guarantees the efficient accomplishment of surveillance and protection of the Territorial
Sea. The principal task is reducing the number of potential illegal shipments, for example
drugs, toxic waste, or other outlaw activities in the Venezuelan sea.
Currently, several operational activities are executed as a response against this
threat. However, these operational activities require many resources and a considerable
amount of time with negative tradeoffs. These operational tasks depend primarily on
Intelligence efforts that represent a high financial cost. For these reasons the successful
execution of the Maritime Control Mission requires more dynamic and efficient
approaches to maximize operational benefits.
One solution for this problem is the development of a stochastic decision making
model, to analyze and set up inspection or interdiction operations in those areas whose
geographic features represent closed transit areas for navigation. This Decision model
should be an important aid for the execution of Maritime Traffic Control Operations in
closed maritime areas in the Caribbean Sea under the sovereignty of Venezuela.
The main mission of the Venezuelan Navy, during peace, is to guarantee the
observance of the national laws and international rules inside its territorial waters. One
way to accomplish this mission is the permanent surveillance and traffic control for vessels
in its waters. Venezuela is the neighbor of several countries in the Caribbean Sea. By its
geographical position, Venezuela is one of the principal maritime routes and sometimes
serves as an intermediate 'base" for the entire maritime traffic in South America Also,
because of its tropical and calm weather, Venezuela has a heavy tourist maritime traffic,
mainly from other Caribbean colonies or islands. All these factors create a maritime
environment that is often difficult to control and to enforce the observance of laws
Currently, illegal activities such as drug dealing, transport of chemical waste and other
illegal activities are some of the new persistent problems. Their presence requires more
forces and a different approach from that of conventional warfare to defeat them.
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This view makes such operations other than warfare missions a daunting duty. To
face this problem, many questions arise: 1) What is the approximate number of ships that
come in or come out from Venezuelan harbors? 2) What is the area with the biggest
maritime traffic? 3) Given the current number of available resources, how we should
allocate them to execute the desired maritime control in an efficient way? 4) Using the
geographical characteristics of certain coast areas (Natural Navigation Channels), is it
possibly to carry out control policies and inspect the maritime traffic, according to the
current "intelligence" functions?
This thesis develops the required decision model to assist in the process of
allocation of inspection assets to areas.
This study formulates a decision model with stochastic events. Its application
exploits the geographical aspect of the Venezuela Coast and the current maritime scenario
with potential threats like drug dealers and other illegal commercial activities. A model
provides an analytical procedure to determine the best allocation of assets for the
execution of a maritime control mission in closed areas. Asset allocation is based on the
fraction of ships that are carrying illegal cargo in each area j during a time period t. This
model uses forecast information or 'intelligence" to deploy such assets according to a
Bayesian estimation of the illegal fraction. Few quantitative data related to this issue are
available, which makes difficult the use of classical statistical methods.
This thesis should form the introduction document for future studies in this type of
operational requirement, using a probabilistic approach and a decision model to measure
the results of the use of policies.
The model estimates the proportion or fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo
which heads to harbor through natural straits or channels. Using the available
'intelligence" as input to generate an initial estimate of this fraction, the model formulates
a decision making process as a guide to the planner for asset allocation The initial
allocation decision is based upon a weighting using the initial estimated mean of the
fraction of illegal ships with illegal cargo, fi,. Those areas to be inspected with higher
fractions will receive more assets. The model demonstrates that if the decision maker
decides to get a precise estimation of Uj by carrying out several inspection with a fixed
Xll
number of assets in each area, then he/she can maximize the number of illegal ships found
with little change in the asset allocation. On the contrary, when the planner decides to
make inspections only with the prior information from intelligence, he/she may reallocate
assets more frequently, and more inspections are needed to get an estimated Uj value with
a desired precision. Even though this thesis keeps separate the logistics considerations
related to the assets allocation, the fact remains that reducing the uncertainty of the Uj
value should be helpful in minimizing the complexity of the allocation problem.
This thesis involves the intelligence as a quantitative input into the decision making
process. The Bayesian approach makes possible the use of Subjective" information into
the analytical model. The model is used to demonstrate that 'intelligence" can be




A. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This purpose of this study is to improve current Venezuelan Navy maritime control
policies. In the accomplishment of its mission, the Venezuelan Navy is updating and
creating new procedures and tactics to minimize the increasing number of illegal shipping
activities in the Venezuelan territorial sea and interior waters. Also, financial and war
material constraints require that more efficient methods are needed to execute this type of
task and to ensure the achievement of peace and observance of the National Laws.
B. CURRENT SITUATION
The current Venezuela Maritime Control Doctrine is designed mainly to protect
and to place under surveillance the Maritime traffic in a potential war situation. Though
some procedures may be applied during peace situations, the doctrine's war application
uses navigational restrictions. The current day-to-day maritime threats occur in open and
unrestricted navigation areas. This means expeditious analysis and more efficient plans of
actions are required. These plans demand a large amount of information related to the
maritime situation in certain areas or regions. Unfortunately, this information or
'intelligence" should be updated very quickly, given the interaction of lawless actions and
the dynamic nature of the Caribbean area. Therefore operational procedures need to be
highly flexible and quickly set, due to the temporal value of the 'Intelligence."The value
of intelligence decreases rapidly with time.
The contemporary threats require an immediate response. For example: an
increasing and big menace is drug trafficking Drug traffickers use every kind of craft to
transport drugs They use any route at anytime to guarantee the successful arrival of illegal
goods Their dangerous procedures and tactics require large numbers of maritime control
resources.
A constantly changing situation requires the ability to make swift decisions. Every
day, dozens of ships navigate in Venezuelan waters. The Venezuelan Maritime area
includes a large coast with many accessible sites. Several Sovereign State Islands lie close
to Venezuela in their own territorial seas. This fact makes surveillance more difficult due
to legal restrictions. A potential tactic of using natural channels (straits, rivers, river
mouths) might simplify the development of ship inspection plans. These natural channels
usually create 'rows" of ships coming into or out of Venezuelan harbors. Also, Venezuela
owns several small islands, which form a set of "narrow corridors." The use of focal patrol
groups in these areas may allow a more efficient way to concentrate resources with
subsequent favorable results. This situation is shown in Figure 1
.
Figure 1. A ship inspection plan in a
Natural channel
This thesis develops the required decision model to assist in allocating patrol
groups to areas to carry out ship inspections.
C. THESIS GOALS AND OUTLINE
This thesis formulates a decision model with stochastic events. The model exploits
the geographical features of the Venezuelan coast and the current maritime scenario with
its potential threats of drug dealers and other illegal commercial activities. This study
responds to an operational requirement to support the Venezuelan Navy mission, which
includes the enforcement of the national laws and the acquisition of the available means to
provide enough capacity for this type of task.
This thesis is intended to form the introduction document for future studies of this
type of operational requirement, using a probabilistic approach to decision models to
assess the results of potential policies.
The model will have as input the number of ships traversing different natural
channels during a time period, an assessment of the fraction of these ships carrying illegal
cargo, the number of ships a patrol can inspect during a time period and an objective
function. The output of the model will be a policy to allocate the finite number of patrols
to the different natural channels.
Unfortunately no available data exist as to the current number of ships that come
into or out of Venezuelan harbors. Many outsider recreational and fishing ships travel in
these waters. They usually do not report their presence to the local authorities. However,
tankers or merchant ships are regulated in a better way. However, their number is much
smaller than the number of small ships described above.
In spite of the lack of data, a simulation can be used to assess measures of
effectiveness for different policies. The decision model will specify the resource allocation,
given its objective and the corresponding measures of effectiveness.
D. THE MARITIME CONTROL TRAFFIC PROBLEM IN THE
CARIBBEAN SCENARIO
Currently the Venezuelan Navy executes maritime traffic control following
traditional tactical procedures and deploys its forces in different areas along its coast line.
The number of deployed ships corresponds to the availability of ships and is fixed.
Sometimes, the planner is required to move ships from one area to another based on
operational requirements, and the area losing the ships must sometimes wait for a long
period of time to receive additional resources. Often during this time, many opportunities
to intercept or deter illegal actions are missed, with substantial waste of time and
resources. Further, constant operational activities compel tight execution schedules. The
lack of a specified procedure to execute surveillance operations can divert resources
toward activities more related to traditional operational tasks.
Nowadays, Venezuela and other nations have signed several agreements to control
and coordinate efforts against illegal activities such as contraband and drug trafficking.
The importance and exigency of this current issue implies the implementation of a tactical
tool to support efforts against illegal activities, to monitor the observed results and to
make the necessary decision in "real time".
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n. FORMULATION OF THE DECISION MAKING MODEL
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
1. Intelligence
A military operation should not be executed without prior knowledge of the
probable scenario. To ensure success an efficient employment of resource information or
Intelligence" is required to decide the best action, given the objective of the mission. In
this study, it is assumed some intelligence is available to forecast the presence of illegal
shipments in a given area or scenario.
2. Inspection Clearance
Any ship in or entering Venezuela waters can be examined. This assumption is
stated to ensure the randomness of the selection of a ship for inspection.
3. Inspection Time and illegal shipment detection
To make the model formulation more tractable in this thesis, it is assumed that the
time to inspect a ship is known and the detection of an illegal shipment onboard an
inspected ship is certain. This is the most important assumption of this model because of
its impact on the randomness of the inspection process and complexity of the analysis.
4. Number of required resources to inspect a ship
It is assumed that the minimum number of required resources to inspect a ship is
two vessels. This is based upon prior experiences regarding safety and backup.
5. Asset's inspection capacity
A certain fixed asset's inspection capacity is considered for this analysis. Given
that the inspection time is known and fixed, it is possible to calculate how many ships an
asset can inspect during a given period of length/
6. Time to reallocate resources
One important issue is the time to reallocate resources, after an inspection mission
is executed and the decision maker decides to move resources from area j to area k. This
time is considered to be negligible; it is assumed there is enough time between the time of
the decision to reallocate and the start of the new inspection mission.
7. Resources to be reallocated
Regardless of its initial position, any unit or ship can be reallocated to a new region
or area. No logistic or operational constraints affect the desired resource's performance.
Further, only an even number of ships will be repositioned due to the assumption that two
ships are needed to make an inspection.
8. Ships to be inspected
For this investigation, it is assumed the probability of carrying an illegal cargo is
the same for any ship randomly chosen in area j during a time period t. However, it is
both possible and likely that the available 'intelligence" suggests that some ships are more
likely to be carrying illegal cargo than others. This consideration can be incorporated in
further enrichments of this model. For example, a method for ranking the incoming ships
and estimating the probability that a particular ship is transporting an illegal cargo could be
created. Such a procedure would assist in determining which ship will be inspected and to
maximize the expected number of illegal shipments detected.
9. Ships Arrival
For this study, the ships arrival process is assumed as follows: each ship heads to
harbor independently the others. The number of ships that has arrived to harbor during a
time period (t, t+1) is independent of the number of incoming ships in a time period (t-l,t).
Further, the rate of incoming ships does not depend on the time of year or specific
activities during the year; it is considered constant. The arrival process is characterized by
a flow rate, X
} ;
the expected number of incoming ships during a period length/.
B. MODEL STRUCTURE
This model represents a periodic decision making process. For example, each
period may consist of hours, days, a week, a month, etc. At the start of each period, the
planner decides how many patrol assets he/she will employ and how they should be
allocated to different areas. The allocation determines the maximum number of ships that
can be inspected in each area. At the end of each period, the decision maker analyzes the
results and decides to move assets from one area to another or to keep the same asset
distribution. Figure 2 is used to clarify the time notation used in this study. Period t refers
to the interval (t-1, t].
Period Length
Time I
Figure 2. Time representation for a Maritime Control
M ission
Inspection periods are of equal length /, and periods are numbered sequentially
starting at one. The index refers to the starting information that is known before the first
inspection starts.
1. Notation
The following notation is used to describe the elements or factors involved in the
analysis:
t index of time (see Figure 2).
/ period length (hours), (see Figure 2).
I time to inspect a ship. (hours).
m number of areas to be patrolled, indexed j = 1 ,2,3 ... m.
A
j
Flow rate of outside ships coming to harbor through area j during a
time period of length/!
Xj Fraction of ships entering area j that are 'bad" (have an illegal
shipment on board). This fraction is unknown and so is treated as a
random variable,
n Total number of assets that are available for assignment.
Aj (t) number of assets assigned to area j in period t. An asset consists of
a pair of ships. This is a decision variable. Also, we must have that
m
V Aj(t) < n for every t.
j=i
Cap, The number of ships that an asset can inspect per time period in
areaj.
dj(t) number of ships to be inspected in area j in period t. dJ (t)ma .x =
CapjAj(t).
kj(t) number of 'bad" ships found in areaj in period t.
//j(t) Updated mean of the proportion of ships in areaj that are carrying
illegal cargo after all inspections are carried out in period t.
<T}
2
(t) Updated variance of the proportion of ships in area j that are
carrying illegal cargo after all inspections are carried out in period t.
2. The Objective Functions
In a real scenario it is difficult to inspect every ship coming to port. First, to
inspect a ship at sea is a very hard task with many risks, and is usually highly time
consuming. Second, to inspect all ships would demand a huge number of resources and
many hours of operations. These considerations are just some of the constraints present in
the execution of such missions.
Therefore, the problem is how to choose the number of assets, Aj(t), to be
employed in area j during an inspection period t, to achieve one or more of the following
objectives:
A) Reduce the uncertainty on Xj.
B) Maximize the expected number of 'bad" ships inspected in area j, given the
limit on inspection resources.
C) Reduce the expected value of Xj through deterrance.
In analyzing these goals, there is an order of priority. The goal A) must come first
because the proportion of illegal ships in each area must be known as accurately as
possible before goals B) or C) can be accomplished. This priority order is followed. It is
assumed that there is no change in the habitual 'tactics" or shipments procedures executed
by 'bad" ships during successive inspection periods. Once goal A is achieved, the decision
maker can decide how many assets should be assigned in each area j to maximize the
expected number of 'bad" ships intercepted (Objective B). Later, the correct asset
allocation will induce the reduction of the expected value of Xj, due to the permanent law
enforcement through deterrance (Objective C).
3. The Decision Algorithm
In the planning of resources allocation, there is an 'intelligence" input that predicts
the percentage or fraction of ships that carry illegal cargo into each area j. This
information is modeled using a Beta random variable, whose general pdf is :
f(P; (
a
j( t),m ) ) = r(q(0ift «.h (1 _ p)m» t for0 < p < x _
r(ai(t))*r(^(t))
The steps of the procedure are as follows:
(i) The fraction of ships entering area j in a time period that contains illegal cargo
is assumed to have a Beta distribution with parameters Oj(0) and $(0) . The intelligence
information is assumed to provide:
/ij(0) = initial estimate of the mean fraction of ships carrying illegal shipments through
area j,
g 2j(0) = initial estimate of the variance of the fraction of ships carrying illegal shipments
through areaj.
The mean of a beta distribution with parameters a and (3 is
M—^-z, (2.1)
a + ft











. j = l,2...,m. (2.4)
^(0)
These are the parameters of the prior beta distribution for area j, given the forecast or
'intelligence". Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are used frequently in the remainder of the
thesis. When used for some period t, the "0"s in these equations are replaced by "t'"s.
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(ii) Having determined a,(0) and /?(0) , the planner chooses the number of assets
to be deployed for the first inspection period in each area j, Aj(l). The number of assets




J = l,2,...,m. (2.5)
V k=1 Capk ;
Aj (1) is the closest integer if (2.5) does not result in an integer.
(iii) After completion of the first inspection mission, the planner obtains the
numbers of 'bad" ships found in the first period, (kj(l)}. It is assumed that each kj(l) is a
sample from a binomial distribution with parameters dj( 1 ), number of ships inspected in
area j, and probability of success, jU}(0) . This 'hew" information is employed to update
the beta distribution parameters for every area. The 'posterior" distribution is also beta
with parameters:
aj(l) = Q5(0) + kj(l), (2.6.a)
/3(l) = #(0) + tfj(l)-kj(l). (2.6.b)
From these, the updated values of the mean and variance of the proportion of 'bad" ships
in region j, /4(1) and cr
2 j(l), are determined using Equations (2.1) and (2.2).
(iv) A test is made to see whether to end the algorithm or to return to step (ii). The
decision criterion used will depend on the objective function and is discussed in the next
section.
C. ASSETS ALLOCATION AND DECISION CRITERION
The decision making cycle is repeated until the decision maker's established
objective has been achieved. Depending on the inspection mission's objective, the results
will be tested, according to the following procedures:
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1. Objective: Reduce the uncertainty of Xj.
In this case, the decision maker wants to get a more accurate value of the
fraction of 'bad" ships in each area. To accomplish that purpose, he/she decides on an
initial allocation using (2.5) and then continues that allocation.
After the t* inspection period is completed, a coefficient of variation,
CVj(t)
,
is used as a statistic to measure the variability or relative dispersion of the
observed proportion of illegal ships found in each area. CVj(t) is defined as:
CVj(t)= 2®-. (2.7)
m)
Since the proportion of illegal ships after t inspection periods has a beta
distribution with parameters Oj(t) and /5$(t) , substitution of Equations (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.6.a,b) into (2.7) results in the coefficient of variation for the Beta distribution:
cvft) -
/*(t-l) + 4,(t)-ki(t)
\[cs(t-l) + £j(t-l) + dj(t) + l]*[aj(t-l) + kj(t)]
Once, the CVj(t) value is under a given limit, <p, the decision maker
accepts the updated mean of the proportion of illegal ships for this time period t, u.j(t), as
the actual fraction of illegal ships. How to choose the value of <p is discussed in Chapter
III.
2. Objective: Maximize the number of illegal ships found in each area j.
After observing the results of the X
th
inspection period the decision maker
establishes a confidence interval for the odds ratio value e to decide how to reallocate
assets. Denote the lower and upper confidence limits by LCL and UCL respectively.
For any area j if < e, the decision maker will move resources from
P(^<LCL)
area j to other areas, so as to decrease A,(t+1).
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For any area j if - > s , the decision maker will move resources from
P(X, < UCL)
other areas to area j, so as to increase Aj (t+1). The appropriate value of 8 to be used is
explained in detail in Chapter III as is the choice ofLCL and UCL.
D. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRIOR INFORMATION
The use of Bayes' theorem gives an excellent opportunity to exploit all the
information related to this problem, regardless of its structure or numerical representation.
However, it is necessary to be careful in the selection of the 'prior" intelligence as input
for the initial assets allocation. First, unless there is strong evidence of the accuracy of the
intelligence source, the planner should assume a large standard deviation o](0) for the
fraction of ships containing illegal cargo in region j. A large standard deviation will allow
the inspection results in the first period to change the parameters of the beta distribution
considerably, allowing the estimated value of /ij(l) to be much different than the initial
estimate jUj(0). In most, but not all cases, the posterior standard deviation will be smaller
than the prior standard deviation if many 'bad" shipments are found. This is intuitively
reasonable, since the number of ships to be inspected, dj(l), will provide new information,
and increased information should reduce the uncertainty about the fraction of ships that
carry illegal shipments, X,. Thus, it might be expected that additional information would
reduce the standard deviation.
To illustrate this point, an estimated forecast or intelligence is used to observe the
sensitivity of the mean /ij(l) to variations in the prior information. In this example, a
mean, /Vj(0) = 0.16 and a small standard deviation, o j(0)= 0.06 for Xj are assumed,
which give a,(0) =5.8 and #(0) = 30.5 using Equations (2.3) and (2.4).
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Assume that an inspection of 12 ships is made (i.e., dj(l)=12). The beta posterior
parameters are calculated assuming various values of the number of inspected ships
carrying illegal shipments during a time period t, kj(t), and are shown in the Table 1
.
^INSPECTED SHIPS (dj(t))= 12
BETA POSTERIOR VALUES
#BADS(kj) 05(1) ftO) Mj(l) <30)
5.8 4Z5 0.120 a00214
2 7.8 40.5 0.162 0.00275
4 9.8 38.5 0.203 0.00328
6 11.8 3a5 0.244 0.00374
8 n8 34.5 0.286 a00414
Table 1 . Posterior Beta Distribution Parameters Values. Small Variance
Table 1 shows how the inspection results barely affect the present information,
given the prior standard deviation. For instance, the difference between the prior mean and
the posterior mean for eight bad ships found out of 12 ships total is relatively small.
Therefore the decision maker might conclude that the inspection does not improve the
information of the proportion of illegal ships. This point confirms the ideas expressed
above; a prior distribution with a small standard deviation does not lead to a posterior
distribution that reflects the inspection results. For example, if eight bads were found in 12
inspections, the raw fraction of bads suggests that the fraction of bads is more likely to be
closer to yi than 0.28. The eight bads could be a rare event that happened to occur. But
one would have to be very certain of the initial estimate of 0.16 in order to make this
interpretation. Figure 3 displays the posterior beta pdf for each number of bad ships found.
14
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Figure 3. Posterior Beta pdf distributions. Small Standard deviation
On the other hand, a prior distribution with a large standard deviation will reflect
easily any small change in the inspection results. This means that the 'prior information" is
more sensitive to the inspection results; this indicates the need for inspection and gives to
the decision maker a better perception of the new information and the value of Xj.
In this example, a large prior standard deviation cr j(0)= 0.1 is assumed and /ij(0)
= 0.16 as before. The prior distribution with large standard deviation results in an
unambiguous difference for each number of bad ships found during the inspection of 12
ships. Table 2 shows the inspection results with their respective posterior beta distribution
parameters. In this case, there is a substantial difference between the means of the distinct
inspection results. A larger prior standard deviation results in a easier discrimination of the
inspection mission results due to the assets allocation.
# INSPECTED SHIPS (dj(t))= 12
BETA POSTERIOR VALUES
#BADS(k,) Oj(l) PjO) HiO) ^(1)
2.0 22.4 0.081 0.00294
2 4.0 20.4 0.163 0.00537
4 6.0 18.4 0.245 0.00727
6 8.0 16.4 0.327 0.00865
8 10.0 14.4 0.409 0.00950
Table 2. Beta Posterior Distribution Parameters values. Large Variance.
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Figure 4 shows this behavior graphically using the pdf for each Beta Posterior
distribution values, given the number of bad ships found.
«roesjcoo<g>cDCNicpo
o o o
Bad Ships proportion (Xj)
Figure 4. Posterior Beta Pdf Distributions. Large Standard deviation
Another useful consideration of Bayes' theorem is that the decision maker can wait
and revise the estimated fraction after several inspection periods, using the combined
inspection results. Given that inspections are independent each other, the same result is
obtained whether the calculations are made after each inspection period or just once at the
end of all of the inspection periods. This feature of Bayes' theorem is very important, since
it reduces the number of applications of the theorem required to revise the proportion of
illegal shipments on the basis of various inspections. Of course, the decision maker may
want to revise after each inspection period, primarily because the resulting proportions
may help to decide whether or not to execute another inspection.
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m.INFERENCE AND MARGINAL ANALYSIS
A. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE "DECISION" REGION.
1. Objective A: Reduce the uncertainty of Xj
In Chapter II our first criterion for allocating resources is that the decision maker
should attempt to estimate the fraction of ships carrying illegal shipments as precisely as
possible, based upon the coefficient of variation, CVj(t). The coefficient of variation is
compared to a number <p to evaluate the accuracy of /u}(t) , the estimated fraction of ships
carrying illegal cargo in an area j in a period t.
Our criterion, —^ < <p , can be reformulated as a function of the beta distribution
Mt)
parameters a and /? . Rearrangement results in :





Equations (3.1) and (3.2) and substitution result in:
a>{l)Pi\) 2 (a }(t)f
(os(t) + /? (t))>j(t) + /? (t) + 1) (og(t) + fi (t))
Hence,
/J(t)^^ 2 flB(t)(flB(t)+/|(t) + l).






Substituting (3.1) into Equation (2.4) yields:
(l - #(t) - #(t)p2 ) (l-MO)m = i J- K 7y ; . (3.2)
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The a and P values at equality represent the posterior beta parameters for which
the estimated proportion of illegal ships, Uj(t), meets the accuracy expressed by (p
,
according to the coefficient of variation, CVj. Figure 5 is used to illustrate this concept.
Figure 5. Posterior beta parameters as a function of (p
Figure 5 represents the a and P parameters as a function of the desired accuracy cp
of the estimated mean of the proportion of illegal ships in area j, //j(t) . In this case a
//j(t) value target of 0.3 was employed. Note that the more accurate the estimated fraction
of illegal shipments is required (i.e. the smaller the q> value), the higher a and P values are.
Therefore, if the decision maker attempts to estimate the fraction of ships carrying illegal
cargo in an area j with a high precision, then a bigger number of ships should be inspected
to get a more accurate estimation of /4 This means a higher number of resources should
be employed or more inspections should be carried out.
Following the above discussion, it is not clear that a constant value of cp can be
used for a large range of /ij (t) values, or what value of (p to use. Choosing a lower value
of (p will ensure a lower variance on Xj relative to #(t), but it will require more
inspections (and hence time periods) to achieve the desired result.
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Recall that after t inspection periods Xj has a beta distribution with mean ju, (t),
and standard deviation cp//, (t). Figure 6 shows the 95% credible interval for Xj for values
of //j (t) between 0.1 and 0.3 when cp is 0.05 and 0.1. These credible intervals are






Figure 6. 95% Credible Interval for jm as a function of (p.
Note that the smaller the cp value, the smaller the credible interval. This credible
interval should be interpreted as follows: there is a probability of .95 that the true fraction
of ships with illegal cargo in an area j, Xj, takes a value between the interval limits. In the
remainder of this thesis a cp value of 0. 1 is used.
2. Objective B: Maximize the number of illegal incoming ships
intercepted, kj(t).
P(X > x)
In Chapter II, the odds ratio is suggested as the criterion to decide the
P\X) < x)
reallocation of resources among the areas. Let 8 represent the level by which to measure
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the odds of the fraction of illegal ships, given the inspection results. To used this criterion
we need to decide on a value of x as well as the value of 8.
Recall that /i, (t) plays a central role in determining the allocation of assets using
Equation (2.5). Therefore we should evaluate how the outcomes of the inspection in any
period effect the estimation of //j (t). For this reason x will be set equal to jus (t).
Suppose objective A is complete in period t. Then Xj has a beta distribution with





-, and are shown in column 2 in Table 3. It is seen to be between 0.95 and
P(x><rt0)
0.97 for every value of //j(t) between 0.02 and 0.3 when cp = 0.1. In period (t+1) the
number of illegal ships found is denoted by Kj(t+1). When this random variable takes on
All, AA ' k A *W ft" P(Xi ~ A*(0lft(t) = kj)the value k, our odds ratio, based on this new information, is —
;
f .
P(Xi < M0|Kj(t) = kj)
For small values of /ij (t) we would not expect large numbers of illegal ships to be
found. If a large value of kj is found in period (t+1) it would indicate that /^(t+l) has
increased from /ij(t), and so more assets should be moved into area j. Similarly, a small
value of kj in (t+1) would indicate that //j (t+1) is smaller than //j (t), and so assets can be
moved out of area j. Columns 3 through 10 in Table 3 show these (posterior) odds for
values of kj(t+l) between and 7 when dj(t+l) is 12.
Having set x equal to /ij (t), the next problem is to decide on a value for 8. As has
just been pointed out, a high or low conditional odds indicates a change in the value of
jU] (t). For reasons that are presented below we choose an upper value of 8 to be 1.5 and a
lower value of 0.67 when /^ (t). is 0.16. Using these 8 values in Table 3, if 5 or more
illegal ships are found in period (t+1) we conclude that /^(t+l) > ju} (t) and use a new
value together with other new values from other areas to reallocate assets using Equation
(2.5). Similarly, if no illegal ships are found, we conclude that //j(t+l) < /^(t) and
reallocate accordingly. If between 1 and 4 illegal ships are found we conclude that //, (t+1)
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= /ij(t). The calculation of //i(t+l) when it is considered different from //,(t) is shown in
Section B below.
To justify the choices of 1.5 and 0.67 for upper and lower values of e when //, (t).
is 0.16, we further analyze the outcome of the inspection results in period (t+1). At the
start of period (t+1), it is reasonably to assume that the number of illegal ships found in
period (t+1) is a binomial random variable with parameters dj(t+l) and /i, (t). For the case
when /ij (t)-0.16, P(Kj(t + l)>5) = 1-B(4; 12, 0.16) - 0.0310 and P(Kj(t + l) > 4) = 1-
B(3; 12, 0.16) = 0.11 1. Thus using a 5% cut-off value, we would claim /« (t+1) > /« (t) if
kj(t+l)> 5. This agrees with the value obtained using the e value of 1.5 in Table 3. For
other values of /^(t) in the range of 0.02 and 0.30, the critical levels of kj(t+l) are
approximately equal using 8 values of 1.5 and 0.67 in Table 3, or cut-off values of 0.05
and 0.95 with the cumulative tail distribution of the binomial. These values are tabulated
and presented in Appendix B.
This above example shows the procedure of calculating the required 95% odds
ratio c bounds. These bounds depend on the /ij (t) value obtained in the completion of
objective A and the number of ships to be inspected, dj(t) Given that each area can have its
own /ij (t) value, its own asset inspection capacity and its own rate of incoming ships; the
odds ratio bounds must be calculated for each area using the procedure described above.
B. INFERENCE AND DECISION FOR ASSETS ALLOCATION
To illustrate the preceding ideas, Table 3 is used to present the Odds values
P(Xi (t + \)>Mt)\W) = k>) ...
—
;
for different values of u,(t) from 0.02 to 0.30 and k. from
P(A'
J (t + l)<M(0|KJ(t) = kJ)
to 7. Assume objective A) is completed at time t using a cp equal to 0.1, for some area j
[i/t) = 0.16
,
and so Gj(t) =0.016. The probability that the true fraction of illegal ships,
Xj(t), is greater than uj(t) is 0.49 so that the odds are 0.49/0.51= 0.96 (see column 2).
Suppose that during inspection period (t+1) 6 of the 12 ships inspected are found to be
carrying illegal goods. Using Equations (2. 6. a) and (2.6.b) the new a.j(t+l) and pj(t+l) are
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89.974 and 446.865, respectively. Using Equation (2.1) the value of Uj(t+1) is 0.167, and
P(Xj(t + l)>0.16|Kj(t + l) = 6) =0.674, so the odds are 0.674/0.328 = 2.07, a value
above the upper bound 8 of 1.5. The increase in odds from approximately 1 to 2 is a
strong indication that the true fraction of illegal ships entering area j has increased, and
that the finding of 6 illegal ships in 12 inspections can not be reasonably explained as
simply a random occurrence.
NUMBER OF SHIPS INSPECTED^ 2
Prior NUMBER ILLEGAL SHIPS DETECTED lc,(t+l)
Hj Odds 1^=0 K.-1 Kj = 2 K, = 3 1^ = 4 1^ = 5 Kj = 6 «W
0.02 0.95 0.91 1.07 126 1.49 1.75 2.06 243 258
0.04 0.95 0.88 1.04 122 1.44 1.70 2.01 138 253
0.06 0.95 034 1.00 1.18 140 1.66 1.97 2.33 178
0.08 0.95 0.81 0.96 1.14 1.35 1.61 1.92 228 173
0.10 0.95 0.77 0.92 1.10 1.31 1.56 137 223 167
0.12 0.96 0.74 0.88 1.06 127 1.51 132 2.18 162
0.14 0.96 0.70 034 1.01 122 147 1.76 2.12 157
0.16 0.96 0.67 031 0.97 1.17 1.42 1.71 2.07 151
0.18 0.96 0.83 0.77 0.93 1.13 1.37 1.66 2.01 145
020 0.96 0.60 0.73 0.89 1.08 1.32 1.60 1.96 139
0.22 0.96 0.56 0.69 055 1.04 127 1.55 1.90 133
024 0.96 0.53 0.65 030 0.99 122 1.50 IJB4 227
026 0.97 049 0.61 0.76 0.94 1.16 1.44 1.78 221
028 0.97 046 0.58 0.72 0.90 1.11 1.38 1.72 115
0.30 0.97 0.43 0.54 0.68 055 1.06 1.33 1.66 108
Table 3. Odds Ratio
When an unexpected number of 'bad" ships is found in period (t+1), the decision
maker needs to calculate the /ij(t+l) value reflecting the extreme odds ratio value. In
Chapter II, it was shown that it is necessary to use a quite high variance to detect the
changes in //, (t+ 1 ) caused by unexpected high or low kj(t+l) values. Having decided that
/ii(t+l) is different from the //, (t) obtained after completion of objective A, it is
appropriate to disregard data from periods 1 through t, and base the estimate of /ij(t+l)
only on the inspection results found in period (t+1). Using the fraction of ships inspected






qj(t + l) = <PH(t + \) (3.3. a)
where (p takes a value of 0.5, large enough to discriminate the possible changes in
posterior inspections, based upon the ideas expressed in Section D, Chapter II. Then
Equation (2.5) is used to estimate the asset allocation to each area according to the new
/ij's.
Having the updated jU] and 0], the new a} and f3j are calculated using Equations
(2.3) and (2.4). At this point the decision maker restarts the inspection process following






To test the reasonableness of the model, the decision cycle calculations are
implemented using an Excel spreadsheet to observe the possible values obtained after an
inspection is executed, the calculation of the posterior beta parameters and the
corresponding inference for each Xj using the mean value of the posterior beta
distribution, Uj. This representation considers two objectives mentioned above: A) Reduce
the uncertainty of Xj. and B) Maximize the expected number of illegal ships found in each
inspection. Each objective is tested under four different scenarios. These scenarios
represent inspection missions of length / of one month. The assets inspection capacity is
expressed by ships per day. Each scenario is defined by: a) Total number of available
assets (N), b) True fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo, Xj, c) Accuracy level of the
estimated mean fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo, q> value and d) Odds ratio 8 value.
Two procedures are considered: 1) The decision maker, using the prior
information or "intelligence", decides first to carry out several inspection missions to get a
more accurate estimate of the fraction of ships with illegal cargo, Uj, for each area j.
Second, he/she allocates assets using the obtained Uj to make inspections with the
objective of maximizing the total number of ships detected with illegal cargo. 2) The
decision maker decides not to minimize the uncertainty of the fraction of ships with illegal
cargo, Uj, as his initial objective. Instead, the planner chooses to maximize the total
number of ships detected with illegal cargo, using only the prior information obtained by
intelligence.
This model contains a single random factor in each period for each area: the
number of illegal ships found in an area j during an inspection period, K,(t) Given this, a
spreadsheet can be used as a simulation tool to demonstrate the analysis and the model
plausibility.
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B. EXAMPLE USING PROCEDURE 1.
Recall that in procedure 1, we start with intelligence estimates as the values of
Hj(0) in each area j and first reduce the uncertainty of these values. The model
representation is displayed in Table 4 for one scenario. The number of inspected ships
carrying illegal cargo are independent binomial random numbers with probability of 0.2.
From intelligence reports the fraction of illegal ships in areas 1, 2 and 3 are 0.3, 0.4 and
0.25, respectively. Following the arguments at the end of Chapter II, we choose a
coefficient of variation equal to 0.5. Using this value the standard deviations for areas 1, 2




Total Assets(n) 25 <p Value 0.1
Real X, (pi,2,3) Q2
Variable description Synid Area 1 Area2 Area3
Area information
Ship arrival rate h 900 750 550
Assets inspection capacity Capj 4 5 6
Initial mean fraction of illegal ships Ui(0) Q3 Q4 Q25
Initial S.D. fraction of illegal ships C5(0) 0.150 0.200 0.125
Initial Beta parameters
Alpha o,(0) 250 200 275
Beta ft(0) 5.83 aoo a25
First Inspection
Illegal ship rate W» 270 300 137.5
Initial assets allocation Aj1 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected 41 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found Kid) 9 8 9
Updated Beta distribution
Alpha o,(D 11.50 10.00 11.75
Beta ftCD 40.83 45.00 2125
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hid) Q22 Q18 Q34
Updated SD. fraction of illegal ships qO) 0.057 0.052 Q079
Coefficient of variation CV 0.258 0.283 0.234
Updated illegal rate W 197.771 136 185
Table 4. Model Representation. Reduce the uncertainty of Xj
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Second Inspection
Assets allocation A,2 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected d,2 44 50 24
# oT illegal ships found Kj2 10 7 5
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha 01,(2) 21.50 17.00 16.75
Beta P/2) 74.83 88.00 42.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(2) 0.22 0.16 0.28
Updated S.D. of fraction of illegal ships tTj(2) 0.042 0.036 0.058
Coefficient of variation CV 0.189 0.221 0.205
Third Inspection
New illegal rate Vtj{2) 198 120 154
Assets allocation Aj3 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected dj3 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found Kj(3) 7 10 4
Updated Beta distribution
Alpha aj(3) 28.50 27.00 20.75
Beta Pj(3) 111.83 128.00 62.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(3) 0.2 0.17 0.25
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships Oj(3) 0.034 0.030 0.047
Coefficient of variation CV 0149 0.150 0.178
Fourth Inspection
New illegal rate \H,(3) 180 127.5 137.5
Assets allocation A,4 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected d,4 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found Kj4 10 9 6
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha a/4) 38.50 36.00 26.75
Beta Pj(4) 14583 169.00 80.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(4) 0.21 0.18 0.25
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships Oj(4) 0030 0.027 0.042
Coefficient of variation CV 0143 0.151 0.167
Fifth Inspection
New illegal rate V,<4) 189 135 137.5
Assets allocation A,5 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected d,5 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found Kj5 6 8 3
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha a,( 5) 44.50 44 00 2975
Beta Pj(5) 183.83 211.00 101.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(5) 0.19 0.17 0.23
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships Oj(5) 00262 00236 0.0365
Coefficient of variation CV 134 0.137 0.161
Sixth Inspection
New illegal rate ^,M,(5) 175 401 129412 124 905
Assets allocation A,6 11 10 4
» of ships to be Inspected d,6 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found K,6 8 5 4
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha a,(6) 5250 4900 3375
Beta Pj(6) 21983 256.00 121.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships H,(6) 0.19 0.16 0.22
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships CTj(6) 0.024 0.021 0.033
Coefficient of variation CV 124 131 0152





New illegal rate X,H,{6) 173.501 120.492 119.758
Assets allocation A7 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected dj7 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found K.7 9 10 7
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha o,(7) 61.50 59.00 40.75
Beta W) 254.83 296.00 138.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships MK7) 0.19 0.17 0.23
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships °j(7) 0.022 0.020 0.031
Coefficient of variation cv 0.114 0.119 0.137
Eigth Inspection
New illegal rate w> 174.974 124.648 125.209
Assets allocation A,8 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected d
(
8 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found Kj8 7 14 3
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha «,(8) 68.50 73.00 43.75
Beta Pj(8) 291.83 332.00 159.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships h(8) 0.19 0.18 0.22
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships cjj(8) 0.0206 0.0191 0.0288
Coefficient of variation CV 0.109 0.106 0.134
Ninth Inspection
New illegal rate ^MjIS) 171.092 135.185 118.534
Assets allocation A9 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected d,9 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found K,9 9 13 4
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha o,(9) 77.50 86.00 47.75
Beta Pj(9) 326.83 369.00 179.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships M,(9) 0.19 0.19 0.21
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships 05(9) 0.020 0.018 0.027
Coefficient of variation CV 0.096 0.092 0.121
Tenth Inspection
New illegal rate X^O) 17Z506 141.758 115.694
Assets allocation A,10 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected 01,10 44 50 24
tt of illegal ships found K,W 9 8 4
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha o,(10) 86.50 94.00 51.75
Beta ft(10) 361.83 411.00 199.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships M,(10) 0.19 0.19 0.21
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships Oj(10) 0.019 0.017 0.025
Coefficient of variation CV 0.096 0.093 0.124
Table 4. Model Representation. Reduce the uncertainty of Xj (Continuation).
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Eleventh Inspection
New illegal rate tydO) 173.643 139.604 113.396
Assets allocation A, 11 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected dj11 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found KJ11 12 10 4
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha 0,(11) 98.50 104.00 55.75
Beta Pi(H) 393.83 451.00 219.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Mj(H) 0.20 0.19 0.20
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships 05(11) 0.018 0.017 0.024
Coefficient of variation CV 0.090 0.088 0.101
Twelfth Inspection
New illegal rate A^UD 180.061 140.541 111.5
Assets allocation /yi2 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected dj12 44 50 24
# of illegal ships found K,12 6 6 4
Updated Beta Distribution
Alpha o,(12) 104.50 110.00 59.75
Beta Pj(12) 431.83 495.00 239.25
Updated fraction of illegal ships h(12) 0.19 0.18 0.20
Updated SD. fraction of illegal ships oj(12) 0.01709 0.01567 0.02309
Coefficient of variation CV 0.088 0.086 0.101
Table 4. Model Representation. Reduce the uncertainty of Xj
.
(Continuation).
The following observations are made from the results in Table 4.
1. CV reduction as a measure of uncertainty of Xj.
Figure 7 illustrates the CV reduction for each area. Notice that for the area with
bigger initial variance, area 3
, it is necessary to carry out more inspection missions to
achieve a variance that satisfies Oj = 0. lu,,. For this example, it took nine months in areas 1
and 2, and 12 months in area 3. This shows the importance of intelligence related to this
type of operations. The number of time periods required to obtain a good Uj estimation








00 On O —
Time Period (t)
Figure 7. Coefficient of Variation Reduction
2. All the estimated fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo, u,,( t ) converge
to the unknown real proportion , 0.2 in all areas.
Figure 8 displays how the Hj(t)'s values get closer to the real proportion of illegal
ships in each area This result indicates that the model can be used as an adequate tool to
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Figure 8. Estimated fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo, jij,.
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Having reduced the uncertainties on each Uj to within a specified limit, assets are
now allocated to maximize the number of illegal ships found.
Table 5 shows the process using this objective. Equation (2.5) is used to
recalculate the assets allocated to each area j at the start of every period.
OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZENUMBER OFILLEGAL SHIPSFOUND
95% ODDS RATIO BOUNDS Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
tOWER 0.36 0.43 0.44
Total Assets (n) 25 90 1.99 1.96 1.72
Real X, (j=l,2,3) 0.2








Assets inspection capacity Capj 4 5 6
Initial mean fraction of illegal ships Mj(0) 0.19 0.18 0.20
Initial S.D. fraction of illegal ships rjj(0) 0019 0.018 0.020








Illegal ship rate A^IO) 171 135 110
Initial assets allocation A/l) 12 8 5
U of ships to be inspected 4(1) 48 40 30
Expected number of illegal ships EIKjdll 9.6 ao 6.0
# of illegal ships found Kj(1) 7 7 5
Posterior Odds Ratio P(X
3
>h(0))/P(XJ<u](0)) 065 0.93 0.79
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships h(D 0.19 0.18 0.20
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships a/1) 02 0018 a020
Updated Beta parameters
Oj(l) 8081 81.82 7a80Alpha
Beta (3j(l) 344.51 372.74 319.20
Updated illegal rate W) 171 135 110
Second Inspection
A2 12 8 5New assets allocation
U of ships to be inspected <P 48 40 30
Expected number of illegal ships EIKK2J1 a6 ao ao
# of illegal ships found K£ 9 8 5
Table 5. Maximizing the number of illegal ships found.
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Posterior Odds Ratio P(Xj>Hj(l))/P(Xj<Mj(l)) 0.94 1.12 0.79
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(2) 0.19 0.18 0.20
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships 05(2) 0.019 0.018 0.019
Updated Beta parameters
o,(2) 80.81 81.82 79.80Alpha
Beta Pj(2) 344.51 372.74 319.20
New illegal rate W 171 135 110
Third Inspection
Aj3 12 8 5New assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected (1,3 48 40 30
Expected value of illegal ships mm 9.6 8.0 6.0
# of illegal ships found Ktf3) 7 7 2
Posterior Odds Ratio P(X
j
>Mj(2))/PpCj<M
j(2)) 0.65 0.93 0.44
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Mj(3) 0.19 0.18 0.20
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships 05(3) 0.019 0.018 0.020
Updated Beta parameters
a,(3) 80.81 81.82 79.80Alpha
Beta P,(3) 344.51 372.74 319.20
New illegal rate
*iMj(3) 171 135 110
Fourth Inspection
Aj(4) 12 8 5New assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected d
j(4) 48 40 30
Expected value of illegal ships EIKj(4)] 9.6 8.0 6.0
# of illegal ships found M) 5 7 10
Posterior Odds Ratio P(Xj>M^(3))/P(Xj<Mj(3)) 0.44 0.93 2.09
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Mj(4) 0.19 0.18 0.33
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships oj(4) 0.02 0.02 0.17
Update Beta Distribution
o,(4) 80.81 81.82 2.33Alpha
Beta ft(4) 344.51 372.74 4.67
New illegal rate
^Mj(4) 171 135 183
Fifth Inspection
Aj(5) 11 7 8New assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected d
j(5) 44 35 48
Expected value of illegal ships EIKi(5)] 8.8 7.0 19.2
tt of illegal ships found Kj
(5) 8 6 13
Posterior Odds Ratio P(X,>m,(4))/P(XJ<m,(4)) 0.90 0.91 0.22
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships M,(5) 0.19 0.18 0.27
Updated S.D fraction of illegal ships Oj(5) 0.02 0.02 0.14
Update Beta Distribution
o,(5) 80.81 81.82 2.65Alpha
Beta ft(5) 344.51 372.74 7.12
New illegal rate ^(5) 171 135 149
Table 5. Maximizing the number of illegal ships found. (Continuation)
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The observations obtained from this simulated decision process are the following:
3. Observation 3. The odds ratio criterion
Table 6 presents the odds ratio value obtained for the example presented in Table
5. Except for area 3 during the fourth and fifth inspection, all the odds values are inside
the e values bounds,. From the results, it is clear that when the odds ratio value is out of
bounds the model calculates the new assets allocation as a response of the change in the
estimated fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo, \iy Even though a small change might be
considered "normal" due to the process randomness, the model estimation is quite robust
and calculates the appropriate asset allocation as result of the new u/s values. Any odds
ratio value out of limits might be used as an indicator or warning for assets allocation in
future inspection periods. In fact, the decision maker may select a desired Xj value and use
the odds ratio as a "sensor" value to detect a change of unlawful events of this nature.
POSTERIOR ODDS RATIO
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 0.645 0.926 0.793
2ND 0.941 1.116 0.793
3RD 0.65 0.93 0.44
4TH 0.438 0.926 2.087
5TH 0.90 0.91 0.22
Table 6. Posterior Odds Ratio.
4. Observation 4: Maximum number of illegal ships found.
Table 7 displays the number of ships found during the 5 inspection periods for the
example in Table 5. Note that the number of illegal ships found is close to the predicted
expected number of illegal ships calculated according to the updated Uj values These
results are quite satisfactory under the assumptions presented in this thesis They
demonstrate the feasibility of getting acceptable outcomes given the number of assets
available.
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EXPECTED NUMBER OF ILLEGAL SHIPS
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Total
1ST 7 7 5 19
2ND 9 8 5 22
3RD 10 8 6 19
4TH 10 8 6 24
5TH 9 7
# ILLEGAL SHIPS FOUND
19 35
119
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Total
1ST 7 7 5 19
2ND 9 8 5 22
3RD 7 7 2 16
4TH 5 7 10 22
5TH 8 6 13 27
106
Table 7.Expected Number of Illegal ships vs Number of Illegal ships found.
C. EXAMPLE USING PROCEDURE 2.
Sometimes the decision maker is constrained by time and other operational
requirements. So, he/she decides to execute inspection missions to enforce laws trying to
capture the maximum number of ships with illegal cargo starting with the intelligence of
the u/s in each area. Recall from Table 4 that our initial estimates are 0.3, 0.4 and 0.25 for
areas 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Table 8 presents the results of a simulated inspection process
where the estimates of Oj(t), Pj(t), p.j(t) and oj(t) are obtained using the Bayesian
procedure. The assets are reallocated using Equation (2.5).
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OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZE NUMBER OF IILEGAL SHIPS FOUNl)
Total Assets (n) 25
Real X, 0.2








Assets inspection capacity Capj 4 5 6
Initial mean fraction of illegal ships rlj(O) 0.30 0.40 0.25
Initial S.D. fraction of illegal ships rjj(O) 0.1500 0.2000 0.1250
Initial Beta parameters
aj(O) 2.50 2.00 2.75Alpha
Beta Pj(0) 5.83 3.00 8.25
First Inspection
V,(0) 270 300 138Illegal ship rate
Initial assets allocation A,(1) 11 10 4
# of ships to be inspected dj(1) 44 50 24
Expected number of illegal ships E[Kj(1)] 8.8 10.0 4.8
# of illegal ships found Kj(1) 9 12 5
Updated Beta parameters
a/1) 11.50 14.00 7.75Alpha
Beta Pj(l) 40.83 41.00 27.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hjd) 0.22 0.25 0.22
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships CTj(l) 0.06 0.06 0.07
Updated illegal rate fyljd) 197.77 190.91 121.79
Second Inspection
Aj(2) 11 9 5New assets allocation
tt of ships to be inspected V) 44 45 30
Expected number of illegal ships E[Kj(2)] 8.8 9.0 6.0
» of illegal ships found Kj(2) 9 12 6
Updated Beta parameters
a/2) 20.50 26.00 13.75Alpha
Beta Pj(2) 75.83 74.00 51.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(2) 0.21 0.26 0.21
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships ffj(2) 0.04 0.04 0.05
New illegal rate \^2) 191.52 195.00 116.35
Third Inspection
A|(3) 11 9 5New assets allocation
H of ships to be inspected dK3) 44 45 30
Expected value of illegal ships E[Kj(3)] 8.8 9.0 6.0
of illegal ships found K/3) 10 14 5
Updated Beta parameters
a/ 3) 30.50 40.00 18.75Alpha
Beta P/3) 109.83 105.00 76.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships rlj(3) 0.22 0.28 0.20
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships Oj(3) 0.03 0.04 0.04
New illegal rate tyijP) 195.61 206.90 108.55
Table 8. Maximizing the number of illegal ships found, using only "intelligence".
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Fourth Inspection
V) 11 10 4New assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected dj(4) 44 50 24
Expected value of illegal ships E[Kj(4)] 8.8 10.0 4.8
# of illegal ships found Kjf4) 8 10 4
Update Beta Distribution
Oj(4) 38.50 50.00 22.75Alpha
Beta Pj(4) 145.83 145.00 96.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Hj(4) 0.21 0.26 0.19
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships CTj(4) 0.03 0.03 0.04
New illegal rate
tyj(4) 187.97 192.31 105.15
Fifth Inspection
Aj
(5) 11 9 4New assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected dj(5) 44 45 24
Expected value of illegal ships E[Kj(5)] 8.8 9.0 4.8
# of illegal ships found Kj(5) 9 6 4
Update Beta Distribution
a/5) 47.50 56.00 26.75Alpha
Beta Pj(5) 180.83 184.00 116.25
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Mj(5) 0.21 0.23 0.19
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships CTj(5) 0.03 0.03 0.03
New illegal rate A#i(5] 187.23 175.00 102.88
Table 8.(Continuation).
From this examples the remarks obtained are the following:
1. With high uncertainty of p.j., the odds criterion can not be used for
asset allocation.
Table 9 displays the asset allocation and the mean of the fraction of illegal ships
carrying illegal cargo from the Bayesian procedure. The initial high variability or
uncertainty of Xj produces a very wide confidence interval. Therefore, after inspection
results, the obtained odds value does not offer clear information for asset allocation. If it is
used would cause large changes in the asset allocation.
ASSETS MEAN
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 11 10 4 1ST 0.239 0.236 0.136
2ND 13 9 3 2ND 0.168 0220 0.146
3RD 11 10 4 3RD 0.165 0.260 0.166
4TH 10 11 4 4TH 0.183 0.234 0.146
5TH 11 10 4 5TH 0.192 0.220 0.150
Table 9. Assets Allocation.
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Even though the odds value criterion is not appropiate for this situation, the
decision maker can decide the asset allocation by the weighted distribution expressed by
Equation (2.5). In this case, the algorithm offers a good alternative when the planner
desires to get a satisfactory inspection result and he/she can not obtain a good estimate of
the fraction of ships that are transporting illegal cargo. Table 10 shows a comparison of
the expected number of illegal ships and the number of illegal ships found for the example
in Table 8. The results are quite acceptable, in spite of the inaccurate initial estimation of
EXPECTED NUMBER OF ILLEGAL SHIPS # ILLEGAL SHIPS FOUND
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Total Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Total
1ST 9 12 5 26 9 12 5 26
2ND 9 12 6 27 9 12 6 27
3RD 9 9 6 26 10 14 5 29
4TH 9 10 5 24 8 10 4 22
5TH 9 9 5 23
125
9 6 4 19
123
Table 10. Expected number of illegal ships and number of illegal ships found.
2. Inspection results guide to the real value of Xj
Figure 9 displays the estimated |i
}
values for each of the three regions. Even
though the planner decides to carry out inspections with a rough estimation of Uj, he can
obtain estimated \i, values with tendency to the real value of Xj.
MEAN Area 1 MEAN Area 2 ——MEAN Area 3 MEAN Real Xj
Time Period (fj
Figure 9. Estimated value of the fraction of ships with illegal cargo.
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The asset allocation variability is low through the different inspection periods.
A comparison between the courses of action that a decision maker can execute
using this model, drives the important observation that despite the decision maker uses
Equation (2.5) under unreliable Uj's values, the assets allocation keeps a regular pattern in
each area during the time periods. Table 1 1 illustrates this point. After the first inspection,
only the assets corresponding to area 2 present a significant change in the asset allocation.
However, there exist an "equilibrium" after the inspections results update the estimate of
the fij's values.
ASSETS
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 11.0 10.0 4.0
2ND 11.0 9.0 5.0
3RD 11.0 9.0 5.0
4TH 11.0 10.0 4.0
5TH 11.0 9.0 4.0
Table 1 1 . Assets allocation.
3. Observation 4: Case 1 and Case 2 trade-offs.
In Case 2, unlike Case 1, the decision maker consider reallocation of assets
between different assets of the end of every period t. In case 1, the asset allocation is fixed
when the decision maker desires to get precise fi/s values for each area. Then he/she
reallocates assets to obtain the maximum number of ships carrying illegal cargo. Recalling
that the underlying goal of this type of operations is to capture those ships involved in this
kind of unlawful activity, it is useful to see what course of action offers the best tradeoff,
considering time and the uncertainty involved in the value of the fraction of ships
transporting illegal shipments, Xj. To analyze this point, Table 12 is used to illustrate the
number of illegal ships found using both procedures. Note that the average number of
illegal ships found per inspection period is slightly higher using procedure 2. From a
practical point of view, the results show that using procedure 2 produces at least as good
38
results as procedure 1 . Ill illegal ships were found in the first five periods using









PROCEDURE 1 373 17 21.94
PROCEDURE 2 123 5 24.60
Table 12. Number of Illegal ships found through Procedure 1 and Procedure 2.
In conclusion, it is reasonable to conclude that procedure 2 is better from a
practical consideration. However, procedure 1 represents a useful method to gather
important information or intelligence related with contraband or illegal shipment. It gives a
clear insight about the presence of these activities. As it was expressed before, an accurate
estimate of the fraction of ships transporting illegal cargo gives the decision maker a




V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The model developed in this thesis provides an analytical procedure to determine
the best allocation of assets for the execution of a Maritime Control mission in closed
areas. Asset allocation is based on the fraction of ships that are carrying illegal cargo in
each area j during a time period t. This model uses forecast information or Intelligence"
to deploy such assets according to a Bayesian estimation of the illegal fraction. Few
quantitative data related to this issue are available, which makes difficult the use of
classical statistical methods.
The model estimates the proportion or fraction of ships carrying illegal cargo
which heads to harbor through natural straits or channels. Using the available
'intelligence" as input to generate an initial estimate of this fraction, the model defines a
decision making process as a guide to the planner for asset allocation. The initial allocation
decision is based upon a weighted distribution using the initial estimated mean of the
fraction of illegal ships with illegal cargo, |_ij. Those areas to be inspected with higher
fractions will receive more assets. The model demonstrates that if the decision maker
decides to get a precise estimation of [i
}
by carrying out several inspection with a fixed
number of assets in each area, then he/she can maximize the number of illegal ships found
with little change in the asset allocation. On the contrary, when the planner decides to
make inspections only with the prior information from intelligence, he/she may reallocate
assets more frequently, and more inspections are needed to get a desired precision for the
estimated \i
}
values. Even though this thesis keeps separate the logistics considerations
related to the assets allocation, the fact remains that reducing the uncertainty of the \i
}
value should be helpful in minimizing the complexity of the allocation problem.
This thesis involves intelligence as a quantitative input into the decision making
process. The Bayesian approach makes possible the use of 'subjective" information into
the analytical model. The model is used to demonstrate that 'intelligence" can be
translated as an important estimator in this stochastic analysis.
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In summary, this model represents a satisfactory starting point to obtain insights
into the problem here presented. It presents an adequate alternative to improve the
planning process of the type of Maritime Control missions presented.
B. FURTHER RESEARCH
Many of the model assumptions represent interesting areas for further
investigations and potential model enrichment. For example:
1. Time to inspect a ship
The formulation of a stochastic model could provide an excellent tool to estimate
this parameter. The associated randomness with it makes difficult the determination of the
required number of assets for an inspection mission. Sea state, ship type to be inspected,
assets capability, training, etc are some of the factors involved in this issue.
2. Probability of transporting illegal cargo
For this study, this value was assumed constant for every ship. However, it is
known that some ships are more likely than others for transporting illegal cargo. Also,
preceding data or frequency of ship type involved in this type of outlaw activities, may be
used to develop a forecast model for determining this probability so that ships can be
ranked based on this value.
3. Incorporation of Logistics restrictions
The scheduling or assets allocation implies constraints or considerations based on
maintenance, personnel rotation, budgets and other conditions which influence ship
distribution Therefore, optimization models are potential tools to evaluate these factors
and to give additional inputs to the planning of Maritime Control missions.
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4. Illegal shipment detection
The design of a stochastic model or an optimization model might be possible to
estimate the probability of detecting an illegal shipments on board. The measurement of
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APPENDIX A. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIOS
In this appendix the additional model implementation scenarios are
collected to show how the model evaluates fictitious Maritime Control missions.
The scenarios are defined by the following factors:
a) Number of Assets availables, N.
b) Real fraction of illegal ships transporting illegal cargo in each
area,Xj. However, in this example, it was assumed that this value is equal for all the areas.
c) Accuracy level of the estimated mean of ships carrying illegal
cargo, Uj.
d) Odds ratio confidence interval, 8 value.
Also, after the completion of each mission, the results are tabulated
to illustrate the inference of results and other considerations.
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A, 900 750 550
Capj 4 5 6
Mj(0) 0.3 0.4 0.25
Oj(0) 0.010 0.015 0.020
«j(0) 629.70 426.27 116.94
Pj(0) 1469.30 639.40 350.81
^Hj(O) 270 300 137.5
Ajl 4 4 2
dj1 16 20 12
OBJECTIVE: REDUCE UNCERTAINTY OF
X
L
Total Assets(n) 10 (p Value 0.1
Real Xj(j= 1,2,3) 0.2




Initial mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected





Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. of fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
Third Inspection
New illegal rate ^(2) 270 293 138
Assets allocation Aj3 4 4 2
# of ships to be inspected d,3 16 20 12
# of illegal ships found K,(3) 3 5 2
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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Otj(l) 629.70 429.27 119.94
Pj(l) 1485.30 656.40 359.81
Md(l) 0.30 0.40 0.25
°j(l) 0.010 0.015 0.020
CV 0.033 0.038 0.079
VMD 267.957 297 138
Aj2 4 4 2
dj2 16 20 12
Ki2 6 3 3
0,(2) 635.70 432.27 122.94
Pj(2) 1495.30 673.40 368.81
h(2) 0.3 0.39 0.25
Oj<2) 0.010 0.015 0.020




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
«j(3) 638.70 437.27 124.94
Pj(3) 1508.30 688.40 378.81
Mj(3) 0.3 0.39 0.25
°j(3) 0.010 0.015 0.019
CV 0.039 0.047 0.088
AjMj(3) 270 292.5 137.5
Aj4 4 4 2
dj4 16 20 12
Kj4 4 4 2
«i(4) 642.70 441.27 126.94
Pj(4) 1520.30 704.40 388.81
Kj(4) 0.3 0.39 0.25
CTj(4) 0.010 0.014 0.019
CV 0.033 0.037 0.077
W" 270 292.5 137.5
Aj5 4 4 2
dj5 16 20 12
K,5 6 5 1
«j(5) 648.70 446.27 127.94
Pj(5) 1530.30 719.40 399.81
rtfS) 0.30 0.38 0.24
°j(5) 0.0098 0.0142 0.0186
CV 0.033 0.037 0.077
^(5) 267.935 287.132 133.331
Aj6 4 4 2
dj6 16 20 12
K,6 3 3 2
otj(6) 651.70 449.27 129.94
Pj(6) 1543.30 736.40 409.81
Mj(6) 0.30 0.38 0.24
Oj(6) 0.010 0.014 0.018
CV 0.033 0.037 0.076
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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Seventh Inspection
New illegal rate ^(6) 267.212 284.186 132.405
Assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected
# of illegal ships found
Updated Beta Distribution
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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Aj7 4 4 2
dj7 16 20 12
Ki7 4 3
<*j(7) 655.70 452.27 129.94
Pj(7) 1555.30 753.40 421.81
rfj(T) 0.30 0.38 0.24
*j(7) 0.010 0.014 0.018
CV 0.033 0.037 0.077
W) 266.906 281.338 129.525
Aj8 4 4 2
dj8 16 20 12
Kj8 4 4 4
Oj(«) 659.70 456.27 133.94
Pj(8) 1567.30 769.40 429.81
H<8) 0.30 0.37 0.24
Oj(8) 0.0097 0.0138 0.0179
CV 0.033 0.037 0.075
7^(8) 266.605 279.195 130.671
Aj9 4 4 2
dj9 16 20 12
Kj9 1 4 3
«j(9) 660.70 460.27 136.94
Pj(9) 1582.30 785.40 438.81
Mj(9) 0.29 0.37 0.24
05(9) 0.010 0.014 0.018
CV 0.033 0.037 0.074
\v,m 265.105 277.121 130.813
Aj10 4 10 2




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
(Xj(10) 661.70 467.27 136.94
Pj(10) 1597.30 828.40 450.81
fij(10) 0.29 0.36 0.23
Oj(10) 0.010 0.013 0.017
CV 0.033 0.037 0.075
fyljdO) 263.625 270.479 128.142









aj(ll) 662.70 477.27 140.94
Pj(ll) 1612.30 868.40 458.81
(Xj(ll) 0.29 0.35 0.23
Oj(ll) 0.010 0.013 0.017




# of ships to be inspected




Updated fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
^(11) 262.167 266.002 129.247
Aj12 4 10 2
dj12 16 50 12
Kj12 4 18 3
a.j(12) 666.70 495.27 143.94
Pj(12) 1624.30 900.40 467.81
[Xj(12) 0.29 0.35 0.24
CTj(12) 0.00949 0.0128 0.01714
CV 0.033 0.036 0.101
Table 13. Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZENUMBER OFILLEGAL SHIPS FOUND






Initial mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected number of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected number of illegal ships
U of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





95% ODDS RATIO BOUNDS Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
LOWER 69 0.40 0.83
85 4.98 2.60 3.52
Symbol Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
h 900 750 550
Capj 4 5 6
Mj(0) 0.28 0.34 0.23
rjj(0) 0.028 0.034 0.023
Oj(0) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(0) 184.42 127.46 257.01
Vj(0) 252 255 127
Aj(1) 5 4 2
dj(1) 20 20 12
ElKjd)] 4.0 4.0 2.4




M](0))/P(Xj<Md(0)) 1.31 1.02 1.52
Md(l) 0.28 0.34 0.23
tfj(l) 0.03 0.034 0.023
Oj(l) 71.72 65.66 76.77
PjO) 184.42 127.46 257.01
w> 252 255 127
V 5 4 2
dj2 20 20 12
E|Kj(2)l 4.0 4.0 2.4




Ma(l))/P(XJ<^(l)) 2.01 1.29 1.52
Hj(2) 0.28 0.34 0.23
oj(2) 0.028 0.034 0.019
Oj(2) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(2) 184.42 127.46 257.01
hH% 252 255 127




U of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
U of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







U of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
U of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





Aj3 5 4 2
dj3 20 20 12
E[Kj{3)] 4.0 4.0 2.4
Kj(3) 7 7 2
P(X
j>MD(2))/P(XJ<M] (2)) 1.31 1.02 0.83
M,(3) 0.28 0.34 0.23
qj(3) 0.028 0.034 0.023
Oj(3) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(3) 184.42 127.46 257.01
tyij(3) 252 255 127
Aj(4) 5 4 2
dj(4) 20 20 12
E[Kj(4)l 4.0 4.0 2.4




M](3))/P(Xj<Mo(3)) 0.85 1.02 4.39
Mi(4) 0.28 0.34 0.83
Oj(4) 0.03 0.03 0.42
otj(4) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(4) 184.42 127.46 257.01
^,h<4 > 252 255 458
Aj(5) 3 3 4
dj{5) 12 15 24
E[Kj(5)] 2.4 3.0 9.6
Kj
(5) 3 4 13
P(X
J
>h(4))/P(Xj<M5(4)) 0.90 0.75 0.00
*(5) 0.28 0.34 0.54
Oj(5) 0.03 0.03 0.27
a,(5) 71.72 65.66 1.29
Pj(5) 184.42 127.46 1.09
Xjf!j(5) 252 255 298
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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CV REDUCTION
t CV Area 1 CV Area 2 CV Area 3
1 0.033 0.038 0.079
2 0.033 0.038 0.078
3 0.039 0.047 0.088
4 0.033 0.037 0.077
5 0.033 0.037 0.077
6 0.033 0.037 0.076
7 0.033 0.037 0.077
8 0.033 0.037 0.075
9 0.033 0.037 0.074
10 0.033 0.037 0.075




t Mean Area 1 Mean Area 2 Mean Area 3
0.3 0.4 0.25
1 0.30 0.40 0.25
2 0.3 0.39 0.25
3 0.3 0.39 0.25
4 0.3 0.39 0.25
5 0.30 0.38 0.24
6 0.30 0.38 0.24
7 0.30 0.38 0.24
8 0.30 0.37 0.24
9 0.29 0.37 0.24
10 0.29 0.36 0.23
11 0.29 0.35 0.23
12 0.29 0.29 0.24
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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INSPECTIONS MISSIONS RESULTS SCENARIO
ASSETS
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 5.0 4.0 2.0
2ND 5.0 4.0 2.0
3RD 5.0 4.0 2.0
4TH 5.0 4.0 2.0
5TH 3.0 3.0 4.0
POSTERIOR ODDS RATIO
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 1.308 1.022 1.523
2ND 2.014 1.288 1.523
3RD 1.31 1.02 0.83




INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 0.280 0.340 0.230
2ND 0.280 0.340 0.230
3RD 0.280 0.340 0.230
4TH 0.280 0.340 0.833













EXPECTED NUMBER OF ILLEGAL SHIPS
Area 2

































Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 1
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*d 900 750 550
Capj 4 5 6
m(o) 0.3 0.4 0.25
CTj(0) 0.010 0.015 0.020
otj(O) 629.70 426.27 116.94
Pj(0) 1469.30 639.40 350.81
A.jHj(0) 270 300 137.5
Aj1 7 6 2
dj1 28 30 12
OBJECTIVE: REDUCE UNCERTAINTY OF
X
,
Total Assets(n) 15 (p Value 0.1
Real Xj(j= 1,2,3) 0.2




Initial mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected





Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. of fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
Third Inspection
New illegal rate tylj(2) 270 293 138
Assets allocation Aj3 7 6 2
# of ships to be inspected d,3 28 30 12
# of illegal ships found K,(3) 4 6 4
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 2
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0,(1) 633.70 438.27 118.94
PjO) 1493.30 657.40 360.81
WO) 0.30 0.40 0.25
°j(l) 0.010 0.015 0.020
cv 0.033 0.037 0.079
tyj(1) 268.138 300 136
Aj2 7 6 2
d,2 28 30 12
K,2 5 6 3
Oj(2) 638.70 444.27 121.94
Pi(2) 1516.30 681.40 369.81
*(2) 0.3 0.39 0.25
°j(2) 0.010 0.015 0.019
CV 0.033 0.037 0.078
Aj4 7 6 2
dj4 28 30 12
Kj4 4 4 3
otj(4) 646.70 454.27 128.94
Pj(4) 1564.30 731.40 386.81
K(4) 0.29 0.38 0.25
<*j(4) 0.010 0.014 0.019
CV 0.033 0.037 0.076
Updated Beta distribution
Alpha (Xj(3) 642.70 450.27 125.94
Beta Pj(3) 1540.30 705.40 377.81
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships Uj(3) 0.29 0.39 0.25
Updated S.D.fraction of illegal ships Oj(3) 0.010 0.014 0.019
Coefficient of variation CV 0.039 0.046 0.088
Fourth Inspection
New illegal rate A.j|J.j(3)
Assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
Fifth Inspection
New illegal rate ^^(4)
Assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 2
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Aj5 7 6 2
dj5 28 30 12
Kj5 4 6 3
Oj(5) 650.70 460.27 131.94
Pj(5) 1588.30 755.40 395.81
h(5) 0.29 0.38 0.25
°j(5) 0.0096 0.0139 0.0188
CV 0.033 0.037 0.075
tyij(5) 261.559 283.959 137.5
A,6 7 6 2
d,6 28 30 12
Kj6 4 3 2
Oj(6) 654.70 463.27 133.94
Pj(6) 1612.30 782.40 405.81
H,(6) 0.29 0.37 0.25
oj(6) 0.010 0.014 0.019




# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected
# of illegal ships found
Updated Beta Distribution
^(6) 259.916 278.927 136.481
Aj7 7 6 2
dj7 28 30 12
Kj7 5 9 2
<*j(7) 659.70 472.27 135.94
Pj(7) 1635.30 803.40 415.81
Mj(7) 0.29 0.37 0.25
*j(7) 0.009 0.014 0.018
CV 0.033 0.037 0.074
^(7) 258.706 277.659 135.506
Aj8 7 6 2
dj8 28 30 12
Kj8 6 10 1
«j(8) 665.70 482.27 136.94
W) 1657.30 823.40 426.81
Mj(8) 0.29 0.37 0.24
rjj(8) 0.0094 0.0134 0.0180
CV 0.033 0.036 0.074
^j(8) 257.912 277.023 133.598
A|9 7 6 2
dj9 28 30 12
Kj9 4 1 3
<*i(9) 669.70 483.27 139.94
Pj(9) 1681.30 852.40 435.81
Mj(9) 0.28 0.36 0.24
a&) 0.009 0.013 0.018
CV 0.032 0.036 0.073
*iHlB) 256.372 271.363 133.679
Aj10 7 10 2
dj10 28 50 12
Kj10 8 8 1




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
aj(10) 677.70 491.27 140.94
Pj(10) 1701.30 894.40 446.81
(ij(10) 0.28 0.35 0.24
aj(lO) 0.009 0.013 0.018
CV 0.032 0.036 0.073
LjMj(10) 256.381 265.901 131.885
Aj11 7 10 2
dj11 28 50 12
Kj11 5 8 1
Oj(ll) 682.70 499.27 141.94
Pj(ll) 1724.30 936.40 457.81
(Jj(ll) 0.28 0.35 0.24
Oj(ll) 0.009 0.013 0.017




# of ships to be inspected




Updated fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
4rH"U 255.268 260.82 130.164
Aj12 7 10 2
dj12 28 50 12
Kj12 6 10 1
aj(12) 688.70 509.27 142.94
Pj(12) 1746.30 976.40 468.81
(Xj(12) 0.28 0.34 0.23
Oj(12) 0.00913 0.01231 0.01709
CV 0.032 0.036 0.101
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OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZE NUMBER OFILLEGAL SHIPS FOUND
Total Assets (n) 15





Initial mean fraction of illegal ships







U of ships to be inspected
Expected number of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected number of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





95% ODDS RATIO BOUNDS Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
LOWER 0.42 0.17 0.83
85 2.92 1.17 3.52
Symbol Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
h 900 750 550
Capj 4 5 6
h(0) 0.28 0.34 0.23
rjj(O) 0.028 0.034 0.023
Oj(0) 71.72 65.66 76.77

























































































# of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







U of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





Aj3 7 6 2
dj3 28 30 12
E[Kj(3)] 5.6 6.0 2.4




M](2))/P(Xj<K,(2)) 0.81 0.47 0.83
M,(3) 0.28 0.34 0.23
°j(3) 0.028 0.034 0.023
Oj(3) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(3) 184.42 127.46 257.01
kjMj{3) 252 255 127
A
j(4) 7 6 2
dj(4) 28 30 12
E[Kj(4)] 5.6 6.0 2.4
K
j(4) 5 7 10
P(X
J
>M,(3))/P(Xj<MD(3)) 0.53 0.47 4.39
Mj(4) 0.28 0.34 0.83
<*j(4) 0.03 0.03 0.42
Oj(4) 71.72 65.66 -0.17
Pj(4) 184.42 127.46 •0.03
tyfW) 252 255 458
Aj(5) 5 4 6
dj(5) 20 20 36
E[Kj(5)] 4.0 4.0 14.4
K
J(5) 4 2 13
P(X
j>m3(4))/P(XJ<^(4)) 0.69 0.31 0.00
M,(5) 0.28 0.34 0.36
Oj(5) 0.03 0.03 0.18
Oj(5) 71.72 65.66 2.19
Pj(5) 184.42 127.46 3.88
kjHj(5) 252 255 199
Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 2
61
























































Table 13.Procedure 1. Scenario 2
62
INSPECTIONS MISSIONS RESULTS SCENARIO
ASSETS
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 7.0 6.0 2.0
2ND 7.0 6.0 2.0
3RD 7.0 6.0 2.0
4TH 7.0 6.0 2.0
5TH 5.0 4.0 6.0
POSTERIOR ODDS RATIO
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 0.812 0.469 1.523
2ND 1.239 0.592 1.523
3RD 0.81 0.47 0.83




INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 0.280 0.340 0.230
2ND 0.280 0.340 0.230
3RD 0.280 0.340 0.230
4TH 0.280 0.340 0.833
5TH 0.280 0.340 0.361
EXPECTED NUMBER OF ILLEGAL SHIPS
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Total
1ST 7 7 5 19
2ND 9 8 5 22
3RD 6 6 2 19
4TH 6 6 2 14
5TH 4 4 14 22
96
# ILLEGAL SHIPS FOUND
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Total
1ST 7 7 5 19
2ND 9 8 5 22
3RD 7 7 2 16
4TH 5 7 10 22
5TH 4 2 13 19
98
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OBJECTIVE: REDUCE UNCERTAINTY OF
X
,
Total Assets(n) 20 (p Value 0.1
Real Xj(j=l,2,3) 0.2




Initial mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected
# of illegal ships found
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h 900 750 550
Capj 4 5 6
Hj(0) 0.3 0.4 0.25
05(0) 0.010 0.015 0.020
Oj(0) 629.70 426.27 116.94
Pj(0) 1469.30 639.40 350.81
^Uj(O) 270 300 137.5
Aj1 9 8 3
dj1 36 40 18
Kj(1) 3 8 8
<*j(l) 632.70 434.27 124.94
Pj(l) 1502.30 671.40 360.81
m0) 0.30 0.39 0.26
qj(l) 0.010 0.015 0.020
cv 0.033 0.037 0.077
tyjjd) 266.712 295 141
A)2 9 8 3
dj2 36 40 18
Kj2 7 5 3
Oj(2) 639.70 439.27 127.94
Pj(2) 1531.30 706.40 375.81
h(2) 0.29 0.38 0.25
CTj(2) 0.010 0.014 0.019
CV 0.033 0.037 0.076
w> 261 285 138
A,3 9 8 3
dj3 36 40 18




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
«j(3) 645.70 452.27 128.94
Pj(3) 1561.30 733.40 392.81
Ui(3) 0.29 0.38 0.25
<*j(3) 0.010 0.014 0.019
CV 0.039 0.046 0.086
XjMi(3) 261 285 137.5
Aj4 9 8 3
dj4 36 40 18
Kj4 3 6 4
Oj(4) 648.70 458.27 132.94
Pj(4) 1594.30 767.40 406.81
Mi(4) 0.29 0.37 0.25
°j(4) 0.010 0.014 0.019
CV 0.033 0.037 0.075
kjHj(4) 261 277.5 137.5
Aj5 9 8 3
dj5 36 40 18
Kj5 10 4 7
Oj(5) 658.70 462.27 139.94
Pj(5) 1620.30 803.40 417.81
Ki(5) 0.29 0.37 0.25
qj(5) 0.0095 0.0135 0.0183
CV 0.033 0.037 0.073
Wft 260.127 273.927 137.993
Aj6 9 8 3
dj6 36 40 18
Kj6 7 10 4
«j(6) 665.70 472.27 143.94
Pj(6) 1649.30 833.40 431.81
Kj(6) 0.29 0.36 0.25
aj(6) 0.009 0.013 0.018
CV 0.033 0.037 0.072
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Seventh Inspection
New illegal rate ^(6) 258.803 271.279 137.5
Assets allocation
# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected
# of illegal ships found
Updated Beta Distribution
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Aj7 9 8 3
dj7 36 40 18
Kj7 6 6 3
OjCT) 671.70 478.27 146.94
Pj(7) 1679.30 867.40 446.81
Mi(7) 0.29 0.36 0.25
Oj(7) 0.009 0.013 0.018
CV 0.033 0.037 0.072
A,jMi<7) 257.137 266.559 136.111
Aj8 9 8 3
dj8 36 40 18
Kj8 6 8 5
«j(8) 677.70 486.27 151.94
Pj(8) 1709.30 899.40 459.81
H,<8) 0.28 0.35 0.25
CTj(8) 0.0092 0.0128 0.0175
CV 0.032 0.037 0.070
^(8) 255.522 263.195 136.601
Aj9 9 8 3
dj9 36 40 18
K,9 8 7 6
«i(9) 685.70 493.27 157.94
Pj(9) 1737.30 932.40 471.81
Mj(9) 0.28 0.35 0.25
«j(9) 0.009 0.013 0.017
CV 0.032 0.036 0.068
w 254.697 259.493 137.937
Aj10 9 10 3
d,10 36 50 18
Kj10 7 8 4
Alpha
Beta
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





# of ships to be inspected




Updated mean fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
01,(10) 692.70 501.27 161.94
Pj(10) 1766.30 974.40 485.81
fXj(10) 0.28 0.34 0.25
Oj(lO) 0.009 0.012 0.017
CV 0.032 0.036 0.068
kjfljUO) 253.53 254.766 137.5
Aj11 9 10 3
dj11 36 50 18
Kj11 11 8 4
aj(ll) 703.70 509.27 165.94
Pj(H) 1791.30 1016.40 499.81
h(ll) 0.28 0.33 0.25
qj(ll) 0.009 0.012 0.017




# of ships to be inspected




Updated fraction of illegal ships
Updated S.D. fraction of illegal ships
Coefficient of variation
A.jK(11] 253.84 250.35 137.087
Aj12 9 10 3
dj12 36 50 18
Kj12 9 14 4
Oj(12) 712.70 523.27 169.94
Pj(12) 1818.30 1052.40 513.81
rlj(12) 0.28 0.33 0.25
0,(12) 0.00894 0.01186 0.01652
CV 0.032 0.036 0.101
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OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZE NUMBER OFILLEGAL SHIPS FOUND
Total Assets (n) 20





Initial mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected number of illegal ships
U of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







# of ships to be inspected
Expected number of illegal ships
# of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





95% ODDS RATIO BOUNDS Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
LOWER 0.26 0.07 0.62
95 1.78 0.55 2.60
Symbol Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
h 900 750 550
Capj 4 5 6
Mj(°) 0.28 0.34 0.23
CTj(0) 0.028 0.034 0.023
Oj(0) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(0) 184.42 127.46 257.01
A-jiIjIO) 252 255 127
Aj(1) 9 8 3
dj(1) 36 40 18
E[Kj(l)l 7.2 8.0 3.6
Kj(1) 7 7 5
P(X
j>m3(0))/P(Xj<mj(0)) 0.51 0.21 1.15
Md(l) 0.28 0.34 0.23
°j0) 0.03 0.034 0.023
otj(l) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(l) 184.42 127.46 257.01
W> 252 255 127
Aj2 9 8 3
dj2 36 40 18
E[Kj(2)] 7.2 8.0 3.6
K,2 9 8 5
P(X
J>M3(l))/P(Xj<M](l)) 0.77 0.27 1.15
M,(2) 0.28 0.34 0.23
°j(2) 0.028 0.034 0.019
Oj(2) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(2) 184.42 127.46 257.01
^jrAj(2) 252 255 127




ff of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
ft of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







ft of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
ft of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships







ft of ships to be inspected
Expected value of illegal ships
ft of illegal ships found
Posterior Odds Ratio
Updated mean fraction of illegal ships





Aj3 9 8 3
dj3 36 40 18
E[Kj(3)] 7.2 8.0 3.6




Ma(2))/P(Xj<n](2)) 0.51 0.21 0.62
\>j&) 0.28 0.34 0.23
°j(3) 0.028 0.034 0.023
Oj(3) 71.72 65.66 76.77
Pj(3) 184.42 127.46 257.01
X.jMi(3) 252 255 127
Aj(4) 9 8 3
dj(4) 36 40 18
E[Kj(4)] 7.2 8.0 3.6
K
j(4) 5 7 10
P(X
J>Ma(3))/P(Xj<MD (3)) 0.33 0.21 3.21
*(4) 0.28 0.34 0.56
oj(4) 0.03 0.03 0.28
Oj(4) 71.72 65.66 1.22
Pj(4) 184.42 127.46 0.98
W» 252 255 306
Aj(5) 8 6 6
d
J(5) 32 30 36
E[Kj(5)l 6.4 6.0 14.4




Md(4))/P(Xj<^(4)) 0.52 0.23 0.01
rlj(5) 0.28 0.34 0.36
Oj(5) 0.03 0.03 0.18
Oj(5) 71.72 65.66 2.19
Pj(5) 184.42 127.46 3.88
A.jHj(5) 252 255 199
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INSPECTIONS MISSIONS RESULTS SCENARIO
ASSETS
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 9.0 8.0 3.0
2ND 9.0 8.0 3.0
3RD 9.0 8.0 3.0
4TH 9.0 8.0 3.0
5TH 8.0 6.0 6.0
POSTERIOR ODDS RATIO
INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 0.507 0.212 1.148
2ND 0.774 0.271 1.148
3RD 0.51 0.21 0.62




INSPECTION Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
1ST 0.280 0.340 0.230
2ND 0.280 0.340 0.230
3RD 0.280 0.340 0.230
4TH 0.280 0.340 0.556













EXPECTED NUMBER OF ILLEGAL SHIPS
Area 2
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APPENDIX B. CUMULATIVE RIGHT TAIL BINOMIAL PROBABILITIES
dj(t+l) = 12
Cumulative Right Tail Binomial Probabilities
Ki(t+1) Values
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.02 0.2 IS 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.04 0.387 0.081 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.06 0.524 0.160 0.032 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.08 0.632 0.249 0.065 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.000
0.1 0.718 0.341 0.111 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.000
0.12 0.784 0.431 0.167 0.046 0.009 0.001 0.000
0.14 0.836 0.517 0.230 0.075 0.018 0.003 0.000
0.16 0.877 0.595 0.269 0.111 0.031 0.006 0.001
0.18 0.908 0.664 0.370 0.155 0.049 0.012 0.002
0.2 0.931 0.725 0.442 0.205 0.073 0.019 0.004
0.22 0.949 0.778 0.511 0.261 0.102 0.030 0.007
0.24 0.963 0.822 0.578 0.320 0.138 0.045 0.011
0.26 0.973 0.859 0.640 0.382 0.179 0.065 0.018
0.28 0.981 0.890 0.696 0.445 0.225 0.089 0.027
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